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Notes
FEDERALIZING THE FIRST
RESPONDERS TO ACTS OF TERRORISM
VIA THE MILITIA CLAUSES
BRIAN C. BROOK
INTRODUCTION
Imagine over two thousand men, women, and children quietly
watching a performance of the Nutcracker Suite at the Denver
Performing Arts Studio. Afterward, the audience and performers
leave to return to their daily routine. Two days later, the first signs of
illness appear. Though it is initially dismissed by most as ordinary
cough and fever, as more and more cases pour in, doctors run a
broader series of tests. The results confirm a nightmare—the
audience and cast have been infected with bubonic plague, released
into the air system during the ballet performance. Airborne, the
disease can pass from one person to another by a simple cough. Often
fatal, it places thousands of lives in imminent danger. Indeed, with
Denver International Airport nearby, millions of lives could be lost as
travelers carry the plague throughout the United States and
beyond1—unless, that is, immediate and effective measures are
implemented to combat the awful aftermath of this act of
bioterrorism.
But what precisely are those immediate and effective measures?
This is a technical question, and one for which there are undoubtedly
scores of possible answers. Perhaps a better question, then, is: who
Copyright © 2005 Brian C. Brook.
1. This hypothetical is derived from one of the fictional scenarios actually tested as part of
the TOPOFF (“Top Officials”) exercises, which were a series of tests conducted to assess the
nation’s readiness to respond to the use of weapons of mass destruction on U.S. soil. For a full
description of TOPOFF Denver, see Richard E. Hoffman & Jane E. Norton, Lessons Learned
from a Full-Scale Bioterrorism Exercise, EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Nov–Dec 2000, at
652, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol6no6/pdf/hoffmann.pdf.
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has the authority both to decide which measures should be chosen
and how they should be executed? This Note addresses that
important legal question by suggesting a constitutionally sound
method for ensuring an immediate and effective response to terrorist
attacks on American soil. The proposed method uses the Militia
Clauses of the Constitution2 to bring state and local emergency
response personnel under federal authority.
Although federal agencies such as the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), acting under the authority and
control of the president, are theoretically well-equipped to deal with
these situations, the problem is one of first responders. If roads are to
be closed, buildings evacuated, or infected victims quarantined to
avoid the further spread of disease or more deaths, time is absolutely
of the essence. Local doctors and law enforcement cannot simply sit
and wait for federal assistance to arrive before taking action.
Unfortunately, despite increased funding after 9/11 and years of
preparation, state and local governments are not ready to respond to
3
terrorist attacks, biological or otherwise. An effective response
4
requires federal involvement. Unfortunately, recent federalism
jurisprudence hinders the development of an effective response

2. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16.
Congress shall have the power . . .
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving
to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
3. See Senator Byron Dorgan, Democratic Policy Committee, Are We Prepared? The
Bush Administration’s Failure to Help Local Communities Prevent and Respond to Terrorism,
at http://democrats.senate.gov/~dpc/pubs/108-1-088.html (last visited July 18, 2005) (listing the
failures of the Bush administration in funding and preparing state and local first responders) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal) TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, READY OR NOT?
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH IN THE AGE OF BIOTERRORISM 6 (Dec. 2003), at
http://healthyamericans.org/state/bioterror/ Bioterror.pdf (noting that after two years and nearly
$2 billion of federal bioterrorism preparedness funding, “states are only modestly better
prepared . . . than they were prior to 9/11”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
4. See JAMES F. MCDONNELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN FEDERAL MANAGEMENT OF
DOMESTIC TERRORISM INCIDENTS 36 (2004) (“A response to terrorism in the United States
will require federal involvement due to the complexity of the threat and unique national
capabilities.”).
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mechanism that would combine local manpower with federal
5
expertise.
This Note argues that the Constitution’s oft-ignored Militia
6
Clauses nonetheless allow the federal government to direct the states
and their first responders to prepare for and ultimately combat acts of
terrorism on American soil. Part I explains why the Court’s Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence prohibits the federal government from
coordinating the actions of first responders: such coordination would
constitute impermissible “commandeering.”7 The Militia Clauses,
however, expressly empower Congress to commandeer the states
during specific times of need, and therefore should be considered an
exception to the general prohibition on commandeering. Part II
provides a brief history of the Militia Clauses and, more generally, the
militia in the United States, explaining who comprises the militia and
how Congress can organize it. Finally, Part III argues that the federal
government may use the Militia Clauses to regulate first responders
to acts of terrorism on United States soil. In so doing, the Militia
Clauses could be revived as a fundamental component of the
constitutional system for national security.
I. THE HINDRANCE OF THE TENTH
AMENDMENT TO COORDINATING FIRST RESPONDERS
The Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment8 jurisprudence,
9
construing the limits of the Commerce Clause, works to prevent the

5. See id. (“The Lopez case highlights the limits of the Congress to mandate federal law
enforcement involvement in public safety issues.”); infra Part I (discussing Tenth Amendment
limitations on federal entanglement with state police functions).
6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16.
7. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“The Federal Government may
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program.”).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
9. The Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, is mentioned here because it is the
workhorse of the federal government—no other provision has been construed to empower the
federal government to regulate as broad a swath of activity as has the Commerce Clause. See
Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (1995)
(noting that the Commerce Clause has been used to do so much that one might “wonder why
anyone would make the mistake of calling it the Commerce Clause instead of the ‘Hey, you-cando-whatever-you-feel-like Clause’”).
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federal government from developing effective first-response measures
to deal with the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack. The
Supreme Court interprets the Tenth Amendment as prohibiting
Congress from “commandeering” state governments to serve federal
10
Commerce Clause objectives. Certain sovereign powers, including
those ordinary police powers necessary to provide an effective first
response, are retained solely by the states and therefore cannot be
reached by the federal government.11
The first modern case to use the Tenth Amendment to invalidate
the application of federal law to regulate the states was National
12
League of Cities v. Usery, in which the Court addressed whether the

10. See infra notes 21–27 and accompanying text.
11. Even though the Tenth Amendment prohibits federal regulation of state executive
officers, the Tenth Amendment is inapposite to regulation of private individuals. Although the
regulation of private individuals raises no federalism concerns, at least not as a long as Congress
is acting within its enumerated powers, the problem of first responders cannot be solved by
merely regulating private individuals—those who make up the first responders—directly.
The broadest power of the federal government is undoubtedly the commerce power. See supra
note 9. However, in light of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions in Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S.
540 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990), and United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against Women Act), the continued
expandability of the commerce power to regulate whatever private conduct Congress wants is
seriously in question. At a minimum, Lopez and Morrison seem to require that the activity
being regulated by Congress be in some way “economic” in order to fall under the commerce
power. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (“While we need not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in
our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity
only where that activity is economic in nature.”). It is no longer enough that Congress simply
finds that the activity “substantially affect[s]” interstate commerce—the very nature of the
activity will be scrutinized by the Court. Id. Therein lies the problem of using the commerce
power to create a completely federal first-response program: the response of police officers, fire
fighters, doctors and others to such an attack would hardly qualify as economic activity.
Accordingly, Congress cannot engage in such activity under the commerce power.
The spending power is similarly insufficient, but more as a practical matter than as a
constitutional one. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have the Power to
provide for the common defence and the general welfare . . . .”). Problems with first responders,
after all, remain despite attempts by the federal government to spend billions of dollars on state
and local response programs. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Moreover, money could
only assist in the preparation of first responders, not their deployment; in an emergency, the
federal government would still lack the coercive capacity to tell the state and local actors
precisely what to do because that would constitute impermissible commandeering under Printz.
521 U.S. at 925.
12. 426 U.S. 833 (1976); see also Brent E. Simmons, The Invincibility of Constitutional
Error: The Rehnquist Court’s States Rights Assault on Fourteenth Amendment Protections of
Individual Rights, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 259, 277 (2001) (“In Usery, the Court had held—
for the first time in forty years—that the Tenth Amendment was an independent limit on
Congress’ Article I powers.”).
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states were obligated to follow the minimum wage provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Writing for the Court, thenJustice Rehnquist explained how FLSA violated the overarching
principles of federalism and dual sovereignty implicit in the
Constitution:
Congress has attempted to exercise its Commerce Clause authority
to prescribe minimum wages and maximum hours to be paid by the
States in their capacities as sovereign governments. In so doing,
Congress has sought to wield its power in a fashion that would
13
impair the States’ ability to function effectively in a federal system.

Because the rationale for applying FLSA against the states had the
potential to render them functionally ineffective by eliminating their
ability to allocate resources freely, FLSA could not be applied to
regulate the states.14 The Tenth Amendment prevented the federal
regulation of essential state functions under the Commerce Clause.15
This new landscape for the Tenth Amendment, however, proved
ephemeral.
Nine years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
16
Authority, the Court expressly overruled Usery, holding that the
FLSA should apply to the states17 and obliterating Usery’s “essential
18
state functions” test. This turn of events resulted from a change in
position by Justice Blackmun, who wrote for the majority in Garcia
that the “essential state functions” test had proven itself
unworkable.19 Rather than hold merely that this was the improper test
by which to judge federal regulation of the states, the Court held that
alleged Tenth Amendment violations were essentially nonjusticiable
political questions.20

13. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852 (internal quotations omitted).
14. Id.
15. See id. at 845–46 (“The question we must resolve here, then, is whether these
determinations are functions essential to separate and independent existence so that Congress
may not abrogate the States’ otherwise plenary authority to make them.”) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
16. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
17. Id. at 557.
18. This was also referred to as the “traditional government functions” test. Id. at 530.
19. See id. at 546–47 (“We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of
whether a particular governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’”).
20. Id. at 556 (“[T]he principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that
inherent in all congressional action—the built-in restraints that our system provides through
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Despite the setback to a justiciable federalism in Garcia, the
Tenth Amendment returned to prominence with the arrival of the
21
contemporary Rehnquist Court. Once resurrected, the Tenth
Amendment again limited the power of the federal government,
22
23
albeit this time more narrowly. New York v. United States involved
a contest over the validity of a federal mandate that the states,
through their legislatures, take particular measures to ensure the
proper disposal of low-level radioactive waste.24 Such a federal
mandate was impermissible, not because Congress lacked power to
regulate nuclear waste, but because it required the states to regulate
the waste in Congress’s stead.25 If the federal government wished to
regulate conduct, it had to do so directly, not by using the states as
intermediaries:
While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation
directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress
the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’
26
instructions.

Thus the anticommandeering principle was born: Congress may not
commandeer the political machinery of the states into federal
27
service.
In 1997, the Court extended its New York holding to prevent
federal commandeering of state executive machinery. That is to say,
state participation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that the laws
that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated.”).
21. See Tony Mauro, Speculation Swirls About Rehnquist Retirement, NEW YORK LAW.
(Oct. 7, 2002) (“Once a lone dissenter on issues of federalism, Rehnquist now commands a
majority—albeit a slim one—that has reined in Congress and restored some ‘dignity’ to the
states.”).
22. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (“This litigation presents no
occasion to apply or revisit the holdings of [Usery or Garcia], as this is not a case in which
Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private parties.”).
23. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
24. Id. at 149.
25. See id. at 160 (“Regulation of the resulting interstate market in waste disposal is
therefore well within Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause.”).
26. Id. at 162.
27. In New York, the Court suggested that the anticommandeering principle was not a
novel concept; although not used to strike down any legislation, it had been articulated by the
Court years earlier. See id. at 162–63 (summarizing previous cases in which the Court noted that
Congress’ actions were appropriate because they did not involve “a federal command to the
States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations” (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 761–62 (1982))).
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the federal government could not affirmatively direct the conduct of
28
29
state officers. In Printz v. United States, a pair of police officers
challenged the Brady Bill, a federal law requiring state law
30
enforcement officers to participate in a federal gun-control program.
The Court held that the Tenth Amendment prohibited the federal
government from telling individuals within state executive branches
31
what to do. Summarizing the composite result of New York and
Printz, Justice Scalia concluded for the Court:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to
enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that
Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the
State’s officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions,
to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. . . . [S]uch
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional
32
system of dual sovereignty.

At its most basic level, Printz says that state executive functions, like
legislative functions, may not be commandeered by federal exercise
33
of the commerce power. This seems to speak precisely to the issue of
federal coordination of first responders: the federal government may
neither tell the states how to coordinate their first responders nor
circumvent the states by coordinating them directly—at least not
under the commerce power.
Although the Court has limited Congress’s ability to regulate the
states in Commerce Clause legislation, it has not done so in other
areas. Most notably, in the context of the Civil War amendments, the
Court has had no problem with Congress commandeering state
34
functions such as voting. The difference in treatment arises because

28. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
29. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
30. Id. at 904.
31. See id. at 922 (“The Federal Government’s power would be augmented immeasurably
and impermissibly if it were able to impress into its service—and at no cost to itself—the police
officers of the 50 States.”).
32. Id. at 935.
33. The Court dealt only with limitations on the commerce power. See id. at 937 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (describing why he believed the legislation was not even valid under the
Commerce Clause standing alone).
34. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV; see, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 666
(1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“When recognized state violations of federal constitutional
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these amendments, unlike the Commerce Clause, specifically
35
empower Congress to regulate the states as states. While the
Commerce Clause simply authorizes regulation of commerce among
the states, the Civil War amendments expressly deal with the states as
sovereign entities.36 For example, when a state violates the principles
of due process, Congress may use its Fourteenth Amendment power
37
to regulate how the state behaves. The significance of this difference
is that when a provision of the Constitution specifically defines the
relationship between the federal government and the states in a given
area of law, that provision supersedes the Tenth Amendment’s
anticommandeering principle.
II. THE MILITIA CLAUSES
In none of the cases interpreting the scope of the Tenth
Amendment has the Court discussed the Militia Clauses.38 These
clauses expressly grant Congress the power to regulate the states and
their officers, so long as those officers are part of the militia. The
Militia Clauses provide that:
Congress shall have the power . . .

standards have occurred, Congress is of course empowered by § 5 [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] to take appropriate remedial measures to redress and prevent the wrongs.”);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311 (1966) (upholding Congress’s power under
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to directly regulate and prohibit state voting laws that
stood in the way of equal access to the polls, irrespective of race).
35. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”) (emphasis added); cf. Nat’l League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976) (“[O]ur federal system of government imposes definite
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the States as States by means
of the commerce power.”).
36. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“States
retain sovereignty despite the fact that Congress can regulate States qua States in certain limited
circumstances.”).
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”); cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518
(2004) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike the Commerce Clause, enables
Congress to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16. Indeed, in none of the Tenth Amendment cases did
the Court discuss whether the anticommandeering principle would apply at all as a limit on
congressional powers other than the commerce power. The only times the clauses have been
mentioned since the rise of a justiciable Tenth Amendment in Usery was in Perpich v.
Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 345 (1990), in which the Court decided the
constitutionality of sending National Guard troops abroad for training exercises.
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[Clause 15:] To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
[Clause 16:] To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in
the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively,
the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the
39
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress . . . .

Notice that Clause Sixteen “reserve[es] to the states” the
40
“Appointment of Officers.” Thus, the militia is composed of state
officers; yet Clause Fifteen allows Congress to call forth (i.e.,
commandeer) the militia not only for defense, but also to “execute
the Laws of the Union.”41 Furthermore, the states themselves must
carry out the training of the militia, but they can only do so
“according to the discipline prescribed by Congress,” not according to
their own independent judgment.42
Were the Militia Clauses mere statutory provisions passed under
the commerce power, the anticommandeering principle would clearly
43
prohibit them. But, as part of the explicit text of the Constitution—
an affirmative grant of power to Congress—the Militia Clauses
cannot be in any way limited by the Tenth Amendment, which by its
own terms creates no limit on those powers expressly delegated to the
44
United States. Some notable scholars have even pointed out that the
Militia Clauses could be interpreted to lend considerable support to
Printz’s anticommandeering holding: by expressly providing for the
use of state militias to assist the federal government in executing
federal law, this precludes the possibility of such commandeering in
any other context not expressly delineated in the Constitution.45

39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16.
40. Id. cl. 16.
41. Id. cl. 15.
42. Id. cl. 16.
43. See supra notes 21–33 and accompanying text.
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
45. See, e.g., John C. Harrison, In the Beginning Are the States, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 173, 176 (1998) (“[T]he fact that Congress has that specific power suggests that it is all the
power Congress has.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2197 n.79 (1997) (“One might invoke expressio unius to say
that the Constitution explicitly addresses how the states would assist in executing the laws of the
land, and provides for use of the militia, precluding other possibilities . . . .”).
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Insofar as the federal government is acting under the authority
vested in it by the Militia Clauses, it may regulate the states and their
officers. Therefore, if the individuals that make up first responders
could be part of the militia, and if the goal of defeating terrorism falls
under one or more of the exigencies listed under Clause Fifteen, then
the federal government has a constitutional avenue to federalizing the
problem of making first responders more effective.
However, to determine whether first responders can be regulated
under the Militia Clauses, one must first ask, what precisely is the
militia? A corollary question is, who decides which individuals should
be part of the militia and when they may be called into action? Both
of these questions are addressed in this Part by examining the
relevant history of the militia and the Militia Clauses. Section A
explains the purpose underlying the inclusion of the Militia Clauses in
the Constitution and examines how these clauses were implemented
during the early years of the republic. Section B traces the
development of the militia into the present-day National Guard,
which is essential for understanding how both the federal government
and the states concurrently exercise much of the constitutional
authority to regulate the militia. Section C discusses when the federal
government may “call forth” the militia into federal service.
A. The Early Constitutional Militia
46
Fears of federal tyranny through a standing army were assuaged
by the constitutional militia concept; the militia was to be jointly
47
operated by the states and the federal government. The Militia

46. It is important to understand the distinction between an army and a militia in order to
understand the impetus for granting limited federal control over the militia:
A militia unit was “a randomly conscripted cross-section of the general militia (all
citizens capable of bearing arms) . . . serving alongside their families, friends,
neighborhoods, classmates and fellow parishioners.” Army enlistees, “full-time
soldiers who had sold themselves into virtual bondage to the government, were
typically considered the dregs of society—men without land, homes, families, or
principles.”
David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 588, 599–600 (2000) (quoting AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 53, 55 (1998)).
47. Alan Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitution and the National Guard, 56 U. CIN.
L. REV. 919, 924 (1988). This was a significant advance over the situation under the Articles of
Confederation, which prohibited any national standing army, instead requiring the Congress to
ask the states to use their troops. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 5 (1777). The
Articles of Confederation provide in relevant part that:
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Clauses “expressly struck a particular balance between federal
48
interests and state autonomy in the military context.” Several
compromises were necessary to achieve that balance. First, a timeshare plan of sorts was created for deciding when each sovereign
could utilize the militia, with the federal government limited to use on
an “as-needed” basis.49 Under Clause Fifteen, Congress can call forth
the militia under only three discrete circumstances: “to execute the
50
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”
When not called into federal service, the militia would remain under
51
the command of the states and their governors.
A second important constitutional compromise is found in
Clause Sixteen. The federal government can set standards for the
militia to ensure that the militia will be able to respond effectively in
the event of national emergency, but training and the appointment of
52
officers is left to the states. Two conflicting concerns drove this
compromise:
On the one hand, there was a widespread fear that a national
standing Army posed an intolerable threat to individual liberty and
to the sovereignty of the separate States, while on the other hand,
there was a recognition of the danger of relying on inadequately

The United States in Congress assembled shall have authority . . . to agree upon the
number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its quota, in
proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such State; which requisition shall
be binding; and thereupon, the Legislature of each State shall appoint the regimental
officers, raise the men and cloth, arm and equip them in a soldier like manner, at the
expence of the United States. . . .
Id.
48. Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1032 n.120 (1995).
49. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 347 (1990) (noting the “traditional
understanding” that the militia may only be called into federal service during emergency
conditions).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. The ability to use the militia “to execute the laws of the
Union” initially seems very broad, and during the debates of the Framers, Charles Clay and
Patrick Henry expressed precisely that concern. Hirsch, supra note 47, at 929–30. However,
supporters of the compromise, such as George Nicholas, explained that the use of the militia
would only be “necessary in case the civilian law enforcement mechanisms were inadequate.”
Id. at 930 n.72 (citing 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 392 (1901) (remarks of George Nicholas)).
51. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 12 (1820). The president, as commander in
chief, may only command the militia “when called into . . . actual Service” by Congress under
Clause Fifteen. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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trained soldiers as the primary means of providing for the common
53
defense.

These compromises resulted in a militia that is coordinated day-to54
day by the states; however, the states must at all times ensure
compliance with federal standards on organization, arms, and
discipline.
Significantly, the Constitution imposes no express substantive
limitations on the makeup or potential functions of the militia
generally, dealing instead with the formalistic division of power
between sovereigns.55 Therefore, to discern the substance of what the
militia is, one must look to its early history.
The historical militia was very different from the present
conception of a military force. The militia stood apart from the
regular army because it was theoretically comprised of “citizensoldiers,” rather than professional ones;56 soldiering responsibilities
were part time, leaving the citizens’ day-to-day lives undisturbed
during times of tranquility. Given this theoretically light amount of
responsibility, the prevailing view was that every citizen was
potentially part of the militia.57 For instance, George Mason said,
58
“Who are the Militia? They consist now of the whole people, except

53. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 340 (internal footnotes omitted) (discussing the history behind the
constitutional militia as the basis for determining whether training the National Guard outside
of the United States was a constitutionally permissible use of the militia by the federal
government).
54. Congress’s powers to provide for the organization, arming, and discipline of the militia
existed regardless of whether the militia was actually called into federal service under Clause
Fifteen.
55. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 16:
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving
to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress . . . .
56. Hirsch, supra note 47, at 921.
57. See David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and the Second Amendment Revolution:
Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 897 (1996) “[T]he militia of the eighteenth
century included every citizen . . . .”).
58. Of course, at the time, “the whole people” likely meant adult white males, as they were
the only full citizens. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE
L.J. 637, 646–47 (1989) (discussing the Framers’ ideas of who should comprise the militia and its
intended purpose).
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59
a few public officers.” This view essentially carried the day when
Congress took to organizing the militia.
As between a militia comprised of soldiers and one comprised of
citizens, Congress erred on the side of citizens: “[i]n place of a select
contingent of young men, uniformly and periodically trained,
Congress included every man, and imposed no requirements as to
60
drills or musters.” The 1792 Uniform Militia Act enrolled into the
militia every able-bodied white man between the ages of eighteen and
61
forty-five. Although the militia was large, “as measures of national
defense, they were worthless . . . . It imposed a duty on everyone, with
the result that this duty was discharged by no one.”62 Instead of
providing for the militia with the federal budget, Congress required
63
each man to arm and equip himself at his own expense. Thus,
although it was a topic of heated debate and mentioned in several
constitutional provisions, the militia was incredibly disorganized and
not particularly reliable. Amazingly, despite its obvious failings,64 the
1792 Act remained the only permanent legislation under which the
65
militia was organized for over a century.
The constitutionality of the 1792 Act and the laws passed by the
states to confirm with it, imposing the duty to serve in the militia on
virtually all citizens, has been firmly established. In the first Supreme
66
Court case to deal with the militia explicitly, Houston v. Moore, the
Court stated that the militia provisions “amount[ed] to a full
execution of the powers conferred upon Congress by the
Constitution.”67 In other words, because the incredibly broad 1792

59. 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 425–26 (1901) (remarks of George Mason).
60. Fredrick B. Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181, 187
(1940).
61. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271. Congress gave the states the ability to craft their
own exemptions. Id. The authority to craft exemptions to the congressional directive was
statutory, not constitutional.
62. Wiener, supra note 60, at 187.
63. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271.
64. Even the sponsor of the legislation was opposed to it in the final form in which it was
passed. Wiener, supra note 60, at 186–87. The original proposal, introduced twice before the
1792 Act, would have created a smaller force of young men with explicit training requirements.
Id.
65. Id. at 187. Some variations upon it were passed, but none of them made any substantial
changes to the provisions embodied in the 1792 Act. Id.
66. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 1 (1820).
67. Id. at 15.
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Act was upheld, all citizens could be appropriately conscripted into
68
the militia.
Houston also clarified the bounds between state and federal
control of the militia. Pennsylvania had initiated a court-martial
against a disobedient militiaman despite the existence of a separate
69
federal courts-martial provision. The Court upheld Pennsylvania’s
court-martial because it dealt with disobedience to orders of the
governor, whereas the federal courts-martial provision only punished
disobedience to orders of the president.70 By establishing the federal
courts-martial provision, Congress did not create an exclusive venue
for disciplining the militia.71 The Court thereby affirmed that, as
stated in Clause Sixteen, the states retained substantial power to
organize, arm, and even discipline the militia.
The states, however, could not exercise their powers over the
militia in a manner inconsistent with congressional mandates. In 1859,
the governor of Massachusetts sought an advisory opinion from the
state’s highest court on whether Massachusetts could, contrary to the
72
1792 Act, include black men in its militia. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that the “power to determine who shall
73
compose the militia [was] exclusive” and was vested in Congress.
Therefore, when the federal government drew a picture of what it
wanted the militia to look like, the states had to stay within the lines.
This historical analysis sheds light on the way that the
constitutional division of authority over the militia between the states
and the federal government has developed. At all times, during war
or during peace, Congress has the exclusive power to say who among
the citizenry can or must participate in the militia. The Constitution
does not limit Congress’s power, and the states cannot contradict
federal requirements.
B. The Modern National Guard
1. Transforming the Militia into the National Guard. As
mentioned above, the basic provisions of the 1792 Uniform Militia
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See Wiener, supra note 60, at 187 (“[The 1792 Act] imposed a duty on everyone . . . .”).
Houston, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 2–3.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 28–29.
In re Opinion of the Justices, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 614, 614 (1859).
In re Opinion of the Justices, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) at 618.
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Act remained the sole guidance for the states for over a century. It
74
was not until the Dick Act of 1903 that Congress gave the militia a
much-needed overhaul. The Dick Act represented the first real
75
assertion of federal power to fund and regulate the militia. Fittingly,
given the newly increased federal role, the militia was officially
renamed the National Guard.76 “This ‘National Guard’ represented
the fruition of a process that had been underway from the beginning
of the nation: the evolution of the militia from the whole citizenry
into a select, organized military institution.”77 Section 3 of the Dick
Act required that the National Guard be organized like the regular
78
army within five years. Perhaps the most significant change
implemented by the Dick Act was its termination of compulsory
militia service; participation in the new National Guard was
voluntary.79
The transformation of the militia into the modern National
Guard did not occur through the Dick Act alone, and it was hardly
transformed overnight. Further significant change occurred via the
80
Act of 1908, which provided that when the National Guard was
called into service, it would be available to serve “either within or
without the territory of the United States.”81 This contradicted the
common belief that Clause Fifteen only permitted use of the militia
82
within the territory of the United States.

74. 32 Stat. 775, 775, ch. 196 (1903).
75. Hirsch, supra note 47, at 944–45.
76. Id. Even though the militia as a whole was not so named until 1903, it was only shortly
after the Civil War that “select bodies of men . . . became known as National Guards,” though
they typically devoted their time to “drills, ‘showy parades in harlequin uniforms,’ and, with
distressing regularity, to strike duty.” Wiener, supra note 60, at 191 (quoting FEDERAL AID IN
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES, S. DOC. NO. 67-263, at 205 (1922)).
77. Hirsch, supra note 47, at 945.
78. Wiener, supra note 60, at 195 n.76. In addition to organizing itself like the army, the
National Guard’s training was to be provided by regular army officers. Id. However, due to the
compromise of Clause Sixteen, training was left to the states. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 16.
Accordingly, such training only took place upon application by a state’s governor. Wiener, supra
note 60, at 195–96.
79. Hirsch, supra note 47, at 945. Interestingly, the Dick Act and those that have followed
it did not change the broad definition of militia, specifying that it “consists of all able-bodied
males at least 17 years of age and . . . under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a
declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States.” 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2000).
80. 35 Stat. 400, § 4; see Wiener, supra note 60, at 197 (“In that year, [the Dick Act] was
amended and strengthened.”).
81. Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 343 (1990) (citing 35 Stat. 400, § 4).
82. See infra Part III.A.
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Controversy over the potential use of the National Guard
outside the territory of the United States came to a head in 1916, on
83
the eve of America’s entry into World War I. Congress responded
84
with the National Defense Act, which provided for the Guard to be
“federalized,” completely transforming it from the earlier conception
of a state militia.85 The Guard “was made available for service
abroad” and “was to receive federal pay for armory drills and
86
administrative work as well as for field encampments.” Numerous
other provisions gave the federal government substantial control over
the National Guard, including over training and the appointment of
officers, despite the Militia Clauses’ express reservation of those
powers to the states.87 Significantly, the Guard began taking a dual
oath—”to support the Nation as well as the State, to obey not only
the governor but also the president.”88 A Note in the Harvard Law
Review at the time of the National Defense Act took the position that
by taking a federal oath, members of the National Guard expressly
waived “their constitutional right to object to a draft for other than
the constitutionally specified purposes . . . The net result [was] that
the old sort of militia, known to the Constitution, [was] to be done
away with.”89
Then came World War I. Rather than attempting to call forth the
National Guard under the Militia Clauses, Congress drafted the
90
Guard into federal service. Through this action the Guard became,
for constitutional purposes, part of the regular army, and therefore
there was no constitutional infirmity in sending the Guard to fight
abroad. Unfortunately, the exigencies of war required the established
Guard divisions, each hailing from its own state, to be broken up,
thereby removing the inherent advantage in having troops that train
together go into battle together.91 Most distressingly, the draft
inadvertently caused every member of the Guard that was drafted to

83. Wiener, supra note 60, at 199.
84. Act of June 3, 1916, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166 (1916).
85. Wiener, supra note 60, at 200.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 201.
88. Id.
89. Note, 30 HARV. L. REV. 176, 178–79 (1916).
90. Wiener, supra note 60, at 203. The power to draft the National Guard into the regular
army was upheld by the Supreme Court in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 366–67
(1918).
91. Weiner, supra note 60, at 203.
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92
be discharged from the militia. The end of the war left the states
without a militia force to take care of domestic problems such as
labor strikes.93 Thus, the draft “virtually destroyed the Guard as an
94
effective organization.”
In the years after World War I, the National Guard was again
reconstituted and, thanks to the lessons learned during and after the
war, further federalized. Among the first reforms was the
arrangement of the Guard into national divisions, rather than on a
95
statewide basis. The unintended problem of permanent discharge
from the militia upon draft into federal service was corrected by
statute.96 These reforms culminated in 1933, when the National Guard
was officially reconstituted as a reserve component of the United
97
States Army. This obviated the need to “draft” the National Guard
anytime Congress’s Clause Fifteen powers were insufficient to call
98
forth the militia. Because Guard divisions could be called into
service directly, rather than as individuals drafted separately, the
problem of dismantled units was solved.
“Since 1933 all persons who have enlisted in a State National
Guard unit have simultaneously enlisted in the National Guard of the
United States.”99 The Supreme Court has interpreted the current
status of the Guard as one of “dual enlistment,” meaning that the
Guard is part of the army when called into federal service but is
otherwise part of the militia.100

2. Distinguishing the National Guard from the Militia. Although
both the army and the militia may be deployed to combat national
emergencies, only the militia can be used to resolve domestic disputes
within a state,101 and only the army can be used for international
92. Id. at 203–04.
93. Id. at 205–06.
94. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 345 (1990) (detailing the development of
the National Guard).
95. Wiener, supra note 60, at 207.
96. Id. at 206.
97. Id. at 208.
98. Id.
99. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 346.
100. Id. at 345–46.
101. See Jay S. Bybee, Insuring Domestic Tranquility: Lopez, Federalization of Crime, and
the Forgotten Role of the Domestic Violence Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 43 (1997) (noting
that only upon application by the governor may federal troops assist in the state’s handling of
domestic violence). Aside from the possible constitutional prohibition on the unwelcome use of
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disputes requiring action beyond the territory of the United States.
The dual enlistment of the National Guard thus gives it the breadth
necessary to deal with emergencies at the local, national, and even
international levels.
Although the National Guard may be used for any purpose, its
creation did not dissolve the regular standing army; likewise, the
existence of the Guard does not prevent the states from creating their
103
own militias. Interestingly, the broad enabling language of the 1792
Act did not change significantly with the creation of the Guard via the
Dick Act, which defines the militia as:
[C]onsist[ing] of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age
and . . . under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a
declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and
of female citizens of the United States who are members of the
104
National Guard.

Actually, the additional possibility of female members of the militia
makes the present statute even broader than that created in 1792. The
Dick Act, however, distinguished between the two types of militia:
“(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard . . . ;
and (2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the
militia who are not members of the National Guard . . . .”105 This
statutory definition, which includes most adult men who have not
volunteered for the National Guard, yields little, if any, help in
understanding the nature of the unorganized militia.
Even today, virtually any individual could constitutionally be
called into service of state or federal government as part of the
militia; Congress need only act to organize what is currently defined

federal troops to deal with ordinary intrastate violence, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 clearly
prohibits any use of the Army for civilian law enforcement. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000) (originally
enacted as Posse Comitatus Act, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 152 (1878)) (prohibiting the use of “any
part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws”).
102. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 60, at 190 (“When the Mexican War broke out, the militia
was unavailable because of the constitutional limitations; service in Mexico was no part of
repelling invasions or of suppressing insurrections.”).
103. The legislation currently on the books both creates the National Guard and allows for
the creation of unorganized militia; the latter provision has been used by a number of states to
create emergency response teams. See 10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2000); infra notes 108–11 and
accompanying text.
104. 10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2000).
105. Id. § 311(b).
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106
Even without congressional direction, the
as unorganized.
significance of the statutory “unorganized militia” goes beyond the
occasional radical separatist’s foray into what he believes to be the
107
militia. At least twenty-four states have utilized the congressional
authorization for unorganized militia to create state guards.108 These
state guards essentially train themselves and typically serve without
pay when they are not called into active duty by their governors, even
paying for their own weapons and uniforms—not unlike the militia
organized in 1792.109 The state guards generally fill the role of
community servants rather than soldiers, thanks in large part to the
110
National Guard carrying the burden of most defensive activities.
Despite their noncombat role, the members of the state guards are
acutely aware of their constitutional role as the traditional militia and
are prepared to serve the president, if so called forth.111

106. See William L. Shaw, The Interrelationship of the United States Army and the National
Guard, 31 MIL. L. REV. 39, 44 (1966) (“The term ‘Militia’ has had at least two different
meanings. One refers to all citizens and resident aliens who may be called in an emergency.
These comprise the unorganized militia . . . .”).
107. Until recently, the notion of unorganized militia did not receive much attention. The
recent interest derives from the nongovernmental “Militia Movement” or the “New Militia.”
See Williams, supra note 57 (using the term “Militia Movement” in the article’s title and
throughout to refer to modern civilian groups that fancy themselves militia). These are armed
paramilitary groups comprised of private citizens that fancy themselves constitutionally
protected militia. See Anti-Defamation League: Militia History and Law FAQ, at
http://www.militia-watchdog.org/faq1.asp (last visited July 19, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). These groups have given militias “a bad reputation in the news and entertainment
media lately. They are usually portrayed as little better than outlaws—either home-grown
terrorists, or paranoid gun-nuts ready to make war on the ‘New World Order.’” The Real
Militia, 23 ENGINEER UPDATE (1999), available at http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/
pubs/aug99/story17.htm. The debate over the New Militia illustrates that the unorganized militia
remains undefined by Congress.
108. Id. Express congressional approval of these organizations comes from 32 U.S.C. § 109,
which states in part that “[i]n addition to its National Guard, if any, a State or Territory, Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, or the District of Columbia may, as provided by its laws, organize and
maintain defense forces.” 32 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2000).
109. The Real Militia, supra note 107.
110. About the Stage Guard Association of the United States, Who We Are, at
http://www.sgaus.org/aboutSG.htm (last visited July 19, 2005) (“While in training status [state
guards] also serve civil government and community organizations. This leads to rescue and relief
roles for [state guards] and for all sorts of community service.”) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
111. See id. (“[B]y the U.S. Constitution, Militia is to defend against invasions and
insurrection and to enforce the laws.”).
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C. Historical Limits on Calling Forth the Militia
This Section addresses what precisely is encompassed by the
power to “call forth” the militia under Clause Fifteen. One of the
earliest and most famous instances in which the militia was called
forth was the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.112 President Washington
used the 1792 Act to assemble the militia of four states—Maryland,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia—and personally led them in
a successful campaign to reinstate order in the face of hundreds of
113
recalcitrant Western Pennsylvanians. Notably, Washington did not
classify the actions of the Western Pennsylvania rebels as an
“insurrection” to invoke the 1792 Act, but instead used the Act’s
114
provision allowing the militia to “execute the laws of the Union.” In
classifying his order as an action to execute the laws of the Union,
Washington triggered a set of procedural formalities not present in
the insurrection classification.115 Given the lingering fear of
presidential control over a standing army, it is likely that Washington
deliberately chose the classification that carried with it the greatest
number of checks and balances to reassure the people that the
president could be trusted as commander in chief.116 Whatever the
reason for the decision to observe procedural formalities, it seems
relatively evident that the Whiskey Rebellion could have been just as
easily classified as an “insurrection.”117 Significantly, President
Washington’s decision to follow rigid procedural rules did not create
a lasting precedent followed by subsequent presidents, perhaps
because the fear of tyranny by the executive quickly dissipated.

112. Wiener, supra note 60, at 187–88.
113. FREDERICK T. WILSON, FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES: 1787–1903, S.
DOC. NO. 57-209, at 33–42 (2d Sess. 1903). This was the “only campaign in American history
ever led by the President in person.” Wiener, supra note 60, at 187–88.
114. Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149,
161 n.46 (2004).
115. See id. at 160–61 (detailing how Washington first “sought and received certification
from Supreme Court Justice James Wilson,” then “issued a proclamation commanding the
insurgents to disperse,” and finally “assembled militiamen from four states . . . who eventually
quelled the threat”).
116. See ROBERT W. COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC
DISORDERS, 1789–1878, at 67–68 (“By his actions in the Whiskey Rebellion, Washington had
apparently dissipated the fears expressed in 1792 that these powers could not with safety be
entrusted to the President of the United States.” (internal quotation omitted)).
117. See Wiener, supra note 60, at 187 (referring to this incident, which is typically called the
“Whiskey Rebellion,” as “the Whiskey Insurrection”).
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The War of 1812 marked the first occasion that required a
significant mobilization of the militia, and several interesting events
118
resulted. Although the sudden appearance of British troops on
American soil would, for most people, clearly constitute an
“invasion,” “the Governor of Massachusetts refused to honor the
president’s call for militia, and was sustained in his refusal by the
119
Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth.” In that opinion,
the court stated its belief that the governor had the responsibility to
decide whether to comply with a federal order calling forth the militia
based upon his determination of whether the situation fell into one of
the three exigencies listed in Clause Fifteen and its corollary enabling
acts.120
Fifteen years later, in Martin v. Mott,121 the United States
Supreme Court had the opportunity to weigh in on the issue of who
decides when one of the three exigencies of Clause Fifteen is
present.122 Justice Story wrote:
We are all of opinion, that the authority to decide whether the
exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the President, and that
his decision is conclusive upon all other persons. We think that this
construction necessarily results from the nature of the power
itself . . . [which] is to be exercised upon sudden emergencies, upon
great occasions of state, and under circumstances which may be vital
to the existence of the Union. A prompt and unhesitating obedience
to orders is indispensable to the complete attainment of the object.
The service is a military service, and the command of a military
nature; and in such cases, every delay, and every obstacle to an
efficient and immediate compliance, necessarily tend to jeopard [sic]
123
the public interests.

Today, 180 years later, Martin remains the only Supreme Court
decision on the president’s authority to call forth the militia under
124
Clause Fifteen and the enabling statutes. Thus, the president has the

118. Id. at 188 (“[W]e raised over 527,000 men in all . . . .”).
119. Id.
120. Opinion of the Justices, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 548 (1812).
121. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
122. Id. at 28.
123. Id. at 30.
124. Relatively recently, the Court was once again poised to address the limits of the
constitutional power to call forth the militia in Perpich v. Department of Defense. 496 U.S. 334
(1990). The case involved a governor’s refusal to send the state’s national guard abroad for
training exercises under the theory that the authority to train remained with the states so long as
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exclusive power to decide whether a situation rises to the level of
125
insurrection or invasion.
Out of the War of 1812 came a different but nonetheless
important lesson, one involving the territorial limitations on
deployment of the militia. The New York Militia was ordered to cross
126
the Niagara River into Canada to engage the British. The militia
refused to cross the river, being “unanimously of opinion that ‘to
repel Invasions’ meant just that, and that it did not involve battling
the British in Canada.”127 This set a long-standing precedent for
militias to refuse to leave the territory of the United States. Over
three decades later, during the Mexican-American War, the militia
128
was deemed “unavailable because of the constitutional limitations.”
Even though it did not come from either the text of the Constitution
or the decision of any court, this understanding that the Militia
Clauses only permit the militia to operate within the territory of the
United States was de facto constitutional law.129
In sum, as far as deciding when an exigency exists sufficient to
bring the militia within federal control under Clause Fifteen, the
decisionmaking authority rests solely with the president and is not

the militia had not been called into federal service. Id. at 336–38. Accordingly, a central issue
could have been whether the National Guard was constitutionally called forth into federal
service. However, the Court merely acknowledged the potential limitations on calling forth the
militia for training exercises abroad given the longstanding history of militia use solely for
defense purposes. The Court avoided that issue by recognizing the dual status of the Guard, and
noting that, when called into federal service, the Guard is part of the army and not subject to the
limitations of Clause Fifteen. See id. at 347:
The Governor’s attack on the Montgomery Amendment relies in part on the
traditional understanding that “the Militia” can only be called forth for three limited
purposes that do not encompass either foreign service or nonemergency conditions,
and in part on the express language in the second Militia Clause reserving to the
States “the Authority of training the Militia.” The Governor does not, however,
challenge the authority of Congress to create a dual enlistment program.
125. “Note that Congress cannot itself call forth the militias but may only ‘provide for
calling forth the Militia.’ Someone else (i.e., the president) must call forth the militia.” Steven
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE
L.J. 541, 586 n.173 (1994) (citation omitted). The president’s ability to call forth the militia is
dependent upon Congress providing some statutory basis for having a militia in the first place.
Id. at 585–86.
126. Wiener, supra note 60, at 189.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 190.
129. See Hirsch, supra note 47, at 932 (“[T]he Constitution made the militia a defensive
force only . . . .”); see also Perpich, 496 U.S. at 342 (“Moreover, the legislative history of [the
Dick] Act indicates that Congress contemplated that the services of the organized militia would
‘be rendered only upon the soil of the United States or of its Territories.’” (citation omitted)).
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subject to judicial review. Furthermore, the Posse Comitatus Act,
normally a limit on the domestic use of military personnel, does not
130
apply to militias. The power to use the militia once called forth,
however, is limited by the historical understanding that the militia
cannot be used outside of the territory of the United States.
III. MODERNIZING THE
MILITIA TO RESPOND TO TERRORIST ATTACKS
This Part argues that, consistent with the Constitution and
historical practice, the Militia Clauses can be used to deal effectively
with today’s most important national security threat: terrorism. First,
it addresses whether Clause Fifteen can be appropriately construed to
permit the president to call forth the militia to combat terrorism.131
Second, it considers whether the militia, traditionally a fighting force,
may legitimately include first responders and engage in humanitarian
aid.132 Finally, this Note examines the practical issues that would arise
if Congress adopted this proposed mechanism for federalizing the
133
first response to acts of terrorism.
A. The Authority to Call Forth the Militia to Combat Terrorism
In considering whether the Militia Clauses can provide a way to
federalize the first response to acts of terrorism, the first step is to

130. The current language of the Act succinctly provides that:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force
as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000). A posse comitatus is “[a] group of citizens who are called together to
help the sheriff keep the peace or conduct rescue operations.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1200
(8th ed. 2004). The Act notably does not preclude the militia from acting as a posse comitatus or
otherwise executing the laws. The same cannot be said when the National Guard acts under
federal control. Because of the dual enlistment system, whenever members of the National
Guard are called into federal service, they are instantly placed on the federal payroll and act as
members of the regular army, temporarily relinquishing their status as members of the state
militia. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 347. Therefore, insofar as the militia may be called forth to execute
the laws of the union, the National Guard is generally excluded. 18 U.S.C. § 831(e) (2000)
(providing the only congressional exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, dealing with the event
of an emergency involving nuclear materials). The traditional militia therefore remains free to
do whatever it is called forth to do, without regard for the traditional limitations upon military
actors under federal control.
131. See infra Part III.A.
132. See infra Part III.B.
133. See infra Part III.C.
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determine whether the Militia Clauses permit the “calling forth” of
the militia in the event of terrorism; that is, whether combating
particular acts of terrorism may be classified as executing the laws of
134
the union, suppressing insurrection, or repelling invasions. As noted
in Part II.C, the president has “exclusive” authority to decide whether
one of the exigencies has arisen, and “his decision is conclusive upon
135
all other persons.” Therefore, although this Section argues that
terrorism is a valid exigency under Clause Fifteen, it is merely an
exercise in rhetoric because the president’s decision is not subject to
review.136
Despite that qualification, combating terrorism should be viewed
137
as either insurrection or invasion. An invasion is simply “the act of
invading, especially the entrance of an armed force into a territory to
conquer.”138 Insurrection is “the act or an instance of revolting
esp[ecially] violently against civil or political authority or against an
139
established government.” These two concepts have one common
theme: an attack on the established government and an attempt to

134. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (stating the power of Congress “[t]o provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”).
135. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827). This decision still stands as good law
for calling forth the militia despite subsequent developments on the question of when the
president and state executives may declare a state of martial law. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 2, 124–28 (1866) (holding that the president’s discretion to implement martial law
during time of war is not unfettered and may be subject to judicial review). Because calling forth
the militia is primarily a military decision, it remains within the president’s direction as
commander in chief. The imposition of martial law, on the other hand, directly affects the lives
of citizens by removing their access to the ordinary channels of due process. Sterling v.
Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 404 (1932) (“If it be assumed that the Governor was entitled to
declare a state of insurrection and to bring military force to the aid of civil authority, the proper
use of that power in this instance was to maintain the federal court . . . and not to attempt to
override it . . . .”); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004) (“[T]he threats to
military operations posed by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty as to
trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully the Government’s case and to be heard
by an impartial adjudicator.”).
136. Martin, 25 U.S. at 30.
137. The third exigency, “to execute the laws,” is most likely inapposite to this situation
because of the nature of response to terrorist activity, which primarily involves emergency
response rather than law enforcement. Even insofar as first responders may be called upon to
execute the laws, this exigency likely would not provide for federal intervention because the
militia may only be called forth to execute the laws if the laws could not be executed “in the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by [a federal] marshal.” Wiener, supra note 60 at 187.
138. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2000). An
alternative definition is a “large-scale onset of something injurious or harmful, such as a
disease,” but that is too broad to be useful here. Id.
139. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW (1996).
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change the way of life for the people in the attacked society.
Similarly, terrorism is an attack on the citizenry in an attempt to
undermine the established government while interrupting daily life.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as “the
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
140
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”
Rather than using regiments of soldiers, however, terrorism uses acts
of violence to strike terror in the collective psyche of a people,
thereby altering the people’s way of life and the government’s
policies.141 Because an act of terrorism seeks to accomplish the same
ends as invasion or insurrection through similar (violent) means,
142
terrorism should be viewed as a form of insurrection or invasion.
The disjunctive is used here—”invasion or insurrection”—
because a terrorist attack may be one or the other depending on the
source: insurrection comes from within; invasion from without.
Terrorism, however, can come from anywhere. If insurrection
constitutes revolting against established government, then certainly
domestically-based acts like those of Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma
City would qualify—committing an act of violence and “hoping to
143
spark an insurrection.”
Whether the terrorist acts of noncitizens constitute insurrection,
even though the violence originates from within the United States, is
less clear. However, because the United States is a relatively open
country with millions of immigrants, it must be the case that those
immigrants, whether legal or illegal, are subject to the general
authority of the government. For any individual living in the United
States, terrorist or otherwise, the United States is that individual’s
government, irrespective of whether that person’s presence in the

140. General Functions, 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2004).
141. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note
138 (“The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group
against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or
governments, often for ideological or political reasons.”).
142. The Supreme Court, though not directly weighing in on the issue of whether an act of
terrorism is the same as an act of invasion or insurrection, recently mentioned both insurrection
and terrorism in tandem throughout its 2004 opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 124 S. Ct. 2633,
2664 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (mentioning that statutes criminalizing warmaking and
adherence to the enemy are akin to statutes criminalizing insurrection or rebellion).
143. Martin A. Lee, Oy McVeigh, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN (June 11, 2001), available at
http://www.sfbg.com/reality/27.html (describing the atrocity committed by Timothy McVeigh on
April 19, 1995, when he blew up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City).
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country is merely an attempt to infiltrate the target. Accordingly,
when such an individual tries to use violence to change the policies of
the government and alter the way of life of fellow inhabitants, that
individual is engaging in an act of revolt against the government. On
the other hand, a terrorist attack by a nonresident of the United
States constitutes an invasion. Al-Qaida, for example, is a foreign144
based terrorist organization with a goal of destroying the United
States and supplanting it with an Islamist Caliphate: a goal of
conquest.145 Therefore, when Al-Qaida uses terrorism within the
borders of the United States, this is fundamentally an act of invasion.
The goal is the same as traditional invasion; the only difference is
that, given the current supremacy of the United States’ military
forces, terrorism is more likely to achieve the goal of conquest than
outright invasion by conventional means.
The president should be able to exercise his authority to call
forth the militia to combat terrorism within the United States.
Terrorism may be an invasion when the threat comes from outside
the territory of the United States, and it may be an insurrection if the
threat comes from within. Section B considers the means available to
combat both threats through the militia.
B. The Appropriate Use of First Responders in the Militia
The constitutional reach of the Militia Clauses is extensive:
146
Congress may enroll the entire citizenry in the militia if it so desires.
By incorporating first responders into the militia, they can receive the
federal guidance necessary to effectively respond to a terrorist
attack.147 However, their response will not involve any sort of
traditional combat. This Section simply argues that the Constitution
does not prohibit enlisting the militia to carry out first-responder
activities for three reasons: (1) the militia were not historically limited
to engaging in combat, (2) the nature of the other branches of the
military has changed, and (3) the “fight” against terrorism cannot be

144. COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL
TERRORISM 2003, 131–32 (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
31912.pdf.
145. Al-Qaida Terrorist Group Profile, at http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/qaida.htm
(last visited May 7, 2005) (“[The] [c]urrent goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate
throughout the world . . . .”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
146. See supra notes 53–68 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 4.

101805 06_BROOK.DOC

2005]

FEDERALIZING FIRST RESPONDERS

12/12/2005 3:16 PM

1025

won through combat, but instead requires immediate and effective
humanitarian response. Together, these reasons support a flexible
conception of the Militia Clauses as enabling Congress to conscript
the average United States citizen to take whatever action is necessary
to preserve the nation.
First, although evidence regarding the noncombat activities of
the earliest constitutional militia is not extensive, state militias have
served in both combat and noncombat capacities. During the early
post-Colonial period, the militia was the primary means by which a
148
state governor could exert force to maintain order. Even in the
country’s largest cities, nothing resembling a professional police force
149
appeared until nearly fifty years after independence. Because the
early militia often served police functions, even a purely originalist
perspective would allow the militia to perform police functions today.
Additionally, the unorganized militia that comprises state guards
today is entirely a noncombat force, dedicated primarily to
emergency response.150
Second, the other branches of the United States military have
always had noncombat roles, but, importantly, as these branches’
tactical capabilities have grown, so too have their noncombat
activities.151 For example, the army has had a medical department
since 1775.152 Though not engaged in combat, battlefield doctors that
care for injured soldiers are full members of the military, not merely
civilians accompanying the military. Today, the responsibilities of
military doctors go well beyond simply caring for injured soldiers and
153
include humanitarian missions around the world. Additionally, the

148. 5 J. ELLIOT, supra note 59, at 445 (remarks of Roger Sherman).
149. See Levinson, supra note 58, at 646 (“[T]he development of a professional police force
(even within large American cities) was still at least a half century away at the end of the
colonial period.”).
150. See supra Part II.B.2.
151. The army even engaged in standard law enforcement activities in the South during
Reconstruction. Vladeck, supra note 114, at 168. However, it was anger over the army’s role in
law enforcement that led to the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act. Id.
152. Mary C. Gillet, The Army Medical Department, 1775–1818, available at http://history.
amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/rev/gillett1/.
153. E.g., Kathleen T. Rhem, Military Doctors Discuss Humanitarian Assistance, ARMED
FORCES NETWORK, at http://www.armedforces.net/Detailed/2275.html (Sep. 14, 2004) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
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noncombat role of the military extends beyond medicine into fields
154
functionally similar to those occupied by first responders.
Third, the current threat of terrorism is one against which a
historical militia could not adequately defend. The quintessential
militia member, in the historical context, is the citizen-soldier—the
farmer who, when called, puts down the hoe and takes up the
155
musket. The nature of warfare has changed dramatically since the
eighteenth century, resulting in an abandonment of the concept of a
156
citizen-soldier in favor of professional troops. Thus, if the citizensolder concept were to be revitalized in the twenty-first century at all,
its character would have to change dramatically as well.
The Constitution is clear that Congress would be acting within its
Militia Clause authority if it required all citizens to purchase
weapons, attend regular training sessions, and even kill or be killed if
called into duty by the president.157 Such measures, though, are
unlikely to be effective because of the clandestine nature of terrorists,
who cannot be fought in the same way as conventional soldiers. A
historical militia would not have been useful against surprise attacks
in Oklahoma City and New York, nor would it be effective against
the types of attacks anticipated by terrorism experts. As the enemy
changes, so too must the response. Today, the citizen-soldier is not
the farmer who drops the hoe for the musket, but instead the
virologist who leaves the lab to investigate a terrorist attack involving
a suspected biological agent.
The more damage done by a terrorist attack, the more effective
the terrorists, and the closer they get to accomplishing their goal of
changing governmental policy or, ultimately, destroying a society’s
way of life. Once the attack has been carried out by a terrorist cell,
the only force that can be effective is a humanitarian one. Unlike
traditional war, in which the success of battles is measured by the
numbers of personnel and equipment lost, the success or failure of a
terrorist operation is often all or nothing: typically, the terrorist act

154. See, e.g., 249th Engineer Battalion, United States Army Prime Power, available at
http://249en.belvoir.army.mil/capabs/en249.htm (describing the battalion’s mission as to
“[d]eploy to generate and distribute prime electrical power in support of warfighting, stability
and support operations, and disaster relief operations”).
155. See supra notes 56–73 and accompanying text.
156. In 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt declared that “[o]ur militia law is obsolete and
worthless,” and, not surprisingly, the Dick Act followed on the heels of this comment. Wiener,
supra note 60 at 194–95.
157. See supra note 2 (quoting the Militia Clauses of Article I).
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either succeeds (for example, the plane crashes) or fails (the plane
does not crash). Numerous federal agencies, such as the Central
Intelligence Agency and the FBI, are currently working around the
158
clock to prevent further terrorist strikes. Their efforts might yield
little or no reduction in the damage toll, however, if they fail to
discover and reach the particular terrorist cell.159 There is typically no
long-fought battle; the entire attack lasts but a moment.
Once a terrorist attack has begun, the best way to “win” is
through damage control: the emergency response by first responders
is the best, and perhaps the only, way to combat terrorism. Using a
first-responder militia would reduce the damage caused by a terrorist
attack. By contrast, the traditional conception of the musket-bearing
militia (even equipped with modern arms) would have little, if any,
power to reduce the harm. Accordingly, when deciding who to call
forth to combat terrorism, the president would not only be justified in
calling first responders, he would be gravely mistaken not to do so.
C. Turning Theory into Practice
Establishing a legal basis for federalizing first responders and
actually implementing such a program are different matters. The
practical steps that need to be taken before first responders can be
treated as part of the militia include congressional action providing
for the organization of first responders and development of a plan for
federal deployment of first responders.
Under its Clause Sixteen power to organize the militia, Congress
can precisely designate that specific types of personnel, such as
doctors and engineers, be part of each state’s militia, so that the
militia is ready to respond to a variety of possible terrorist attacks.
Congress has never used its full Clause Sixteen power to precisely
specify who is in the militia, but this lack of precedent should not stop
Congress from defining the militia in a way that includes first

158. Statement
of
John
S.
Pistole,
executive
assistant
director,
counterterrorism/counterintelligence, FBI, Before the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States (April 14, 2004), at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/
pistole041404.htm (last visited May 7, 2005) (noting the FBI’s work “around the clock” and in
conjunction with numerous intelligence partners to prevent terrorism) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
159. This is an oversimplification of sorts, designed around the notion that each terrorist act
is a self-contained event, such as one bomb, or one virus.
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responders. Such a step would depart from Congress’s historical,
160
broad enabling acts—but those acts have been criticized.
Although Clause Sixteen reserves the actual training and
appointment of officers for the states, Congress may dictate the
discipline for such training. Using experts in FEMA and the Center
for Disease Control (CDC), Congress could develop a specific
regimen for the states to implement. Congress could also provide a
mechanism for the states to use such federal experts voluntarily to
train first responders, perhaps providing monetary incentives to
encourage states to do so. Additionally, by taking an active role in the
appointment of officers, Congress would approach full federalization
of first responders under the Militia Clauses. States would retain the
right to appoint individual officers, but Congress could designate
161
specific officer positions and dictate qualifications for each office.
Once a militia is organized, Clause Fifteen gives Congress, and
by extension the president, the power to call it forth under any one of
the three listed exigencies.162 If a terrorist attack occurred, the
president should call forth the first responder militia. As commander
in chief, the president could effectively coordinate first responders
from all parts of the nation to efficiently respond to an act of
terrorism. This course of action creates the nation’s best chance of
averting disaster in a terrorist attack through uniform training and
federal coordination. Construing the militia in this way would turn a
form of historical military service into public service—a concept far
more palatable to the typical firefighter, police officer, or doctor who
might be called forth to serve the national interests in the event of a
terrorist attack.
CONCLUSION
Because of the Court’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment,
the federal government cannot directly prepare or coordinate the
160. Wiener, supra note 60, at 187 (noting that “[t]he basic fallacy of the 1792 Act was that it
was unselective” and explaining how the broad definition of the militia in the 1792 Act failed to
create an effective force such that history quickly made its provisions “obsolete”).
161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
162. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (giving Congress the power to “provide for” the calling
forth of the militia); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States . . . .”); see also supra note 125 (explaining how the
Constitution gives the president the authority to make the decision on when to call forth the
militia).
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activities of first responders under its commerce power. This Note
argues that the federal government can exercise significant control
over first responders by enrolling them as members of the militia.
Congress has the broad and exclusive power to incorporate citizens
into the militia. Although first responders would be in noncombat
roles, history illustrates that army and militia alike may undertake
noncombat goals and pursue them zealously, especially when the
noncombat activities contribute to national security, as in the case of
a terrorist attack. Once the first responders are members of the
militia, Congress has the power to organize, equip, and discipline
them into a well-trained team capable of providing immediate and
effective responses to such attacks. The president would have the
exclusive authority to call forth the first-responder militia, needing
only to first determine whether the attack constituted an insurrection
or invasion.
In the fight against terrorism, the battle is won at two stages:
prevention and damage control. Once a terrorist strikes, the only way
to fight back is by saving as many lives as possible. This means having
well-equipped first responders on the scene immediately and ensuring
that they respond effectively and in coordination with other efforts
that may be taking place around the country. The federal government
can help achieve this goal, while remaining faithful to the
Constitution, by incorporating first responders into the militia. Only
through the heroism of first responders can the United States return
quickly to its feet after a powerful blow and stand ready to fight.

